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Using a multi-country gravity framework, this paper models and quantifies
the relevance of migrants’ job position in fostering Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI). High-skilled migrants are defined as those individuals born in the in-
vestors’ home/host country occupying managerial or professional positions in
the host/home country of investment. Our estimates show that higher shares
of migrants with management skills in a given country promote FDI into that
country. In contrast, an increase in the share of migrants in non-qualified
positions (regardless of their educational attainment) has a negative impact
on FDI decisions. These findings highlight that the FDI-enhancing effect of
migrants is related to a shift in their skill composition due to their occupation.
We test our model on a new global panel data set of Greenfield bilateral invest-
ment with a wide variety of specifications, both at the extensive and intensive
margins. Additionally, we provide new insights into the mechanisms by which
migration influences FDI flows, with particular attention to the relevance of
FDI level and activity.
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This paper seeks to explain the role played by migrants with different levels of
human capital in cross-border investments. In contrast with previous studies, we
focus on migrants’ occupational skills rather than on their educational level. Our
approach deals with the controversial previous evidence regarding the role played
by the educational attainment of migrants as well as with the occupation-education
mismatch.
We start the analysis by presenting a model to explain how high-skilled migra-
tion can affect FDI both at the intensive and the extensive margins. In our model,
a key feature is job heterogeneity within the production process: The affiliate com-
bines headquarters’ blueprints (which requires management and coordination skills)
with capital and low-skilled jobs to produce goods. The composition of the migrant
population in terms of job skills can facilitate this process.
The intuition behind our model may be understood through a historical analogy
to the Navajo code talkers during World War II. The United States Marine Corps
used the Navajo language to cipher war messages sent to submarines in the Pacific.
The complexity of the language made it unintelligible to anyone without extensive
exposure and training. At the outbreak of World War II, fewer than 30 non-Navajo
could understand the language (Nez and Avila, 2011). To be able to navigate, a
submarine requires at least one Navajo code talker to decode the scrambled messages.
Increasing the number of Navajo code talkers in the Pacific makes it possible to boost
both the number of deployed submarines and the efficiency and ship capacity (e.g.,
they can work in shifts). The rest of the crew members have no effect on the number
or capacity of submarines, thus, the crew is a submarine fixed effect. Now, let us
imagine there is a particular submarine where most of the crew is ethnically Navajo,
but unable to speak the Navajo language. This particular submarine faces higher
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search costs to identify the one and only true Navajo code talker. Taken to the
extreme, when all the crew is unskilled in terms of Navajo language, the submarine
will not be able to navigate.
Certain elements of this historical example operate in similar ways in FDI. The
relevant component in this example is the specific ability to speak Navajo. Similarly,
in our context, high-skilled migrants are defined as those individuals born in the
investor’s home/host country occupying managerial or professional positions in the
host/home country of investment. These individuals acquire management or profes-
sionals skills which enable them to manage the relationship with headquarters, like
the Navajo code talkers. Therefore, abundant stocks of skilled migrants should have
a positive effect on both the extensive and intensive margins of FDI, similarly to the
Navajo’s effect on the number and submarine capacity.
Low-skilled migrants are defined as those individuals born in the investor’s
home/host country occupying non-qualified job positions in the host/home coun-
try, regardless of their educational attainment. Their wage is pegged to host country
unskilled wages and consequently the stock of non-qualified migrants, like the non-
code talkers, should have no significant effect on FDI. However, previous empirical
results challenged this prediction, finding that an increase in low-skilled migrants
has a negative and significant impact on FDI flows. In our model, the negative
coefficient for low-skilled migration is capturing the effect of an increase in the ratio
of low-skilled migrants to high-skilled migrants: The costs of high-skilled labor for
the affiliate increase as management skills become relatively less abundant. In other
words, the negative coefficient is capturing the effect of a decrease in the share of
high-skilled migrants.
To the best of our knowledge, our study constitutes a novel attempt to fill some
gaps in the literature on heterogeneous migrant skills and FDI. First, we incorporate
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job skills into a standard model of heterogeneous firms, which delivers a tractable FDI
gravity equation with sharp predictions regarding migration and FDI. Second, we
employ a panel dataset of OECD host countries to estimate the impact of the migrant
job composition on FDI margins, using a structural gravity approach. Third, we
uncover which specific job skills have more influence on several activity sectors and at
different investment levels. An additional contribution is that we clarify the relevance
of accounting for the direction of migration and refining the mechanism by which
high-skilled migration has an effect on FDI. An abundant share of managers in the
migrant stock may reduce specific high-skilled labor costs (communication, search,
wages) for foreign affiliates. In line with our theoretical expectations, estimates
suggest that a higher share of migrant decision-makers has the largest positive effect
on FDI.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 provides an overview of the
relevant literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 describes the data and
the econometric specification. Section 5 details the results and section 6 concludes.
2 Background
“An efficient way to organize multinational production across locations (...) is
to hire talented workers who are able to carry out production activities with very
little supervision” (Cristea, 2015, p. 257). Therefore, hiring talented migrants may
constitute a mechanism for mitigating communication costs between headquarters
and their foreign affiliates. As stated by De Smet, “The ease of hiring skilled expatri-
ates is one of the factors that are taken into consideration in the location decision of
multinationals. When the required expertise cannot be sourced in the hosting coun-
try, skilled immigrants are necessary to start-up new subsidiaries and train workers”
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(2013, p. 4).
By acting as an information-revealing network, migrants may reduce transactions
costs, encouraging bilateral investments. They understand the language, culture,
values and practices of their home as well as their host country. The positive associ-
ation between ethnic networks and FDI has already been found by previous papers
(see Buch et al., 2006; Burchardi et al., 2016; Federici and Giannetti, 2010; Foad,
2012; Gao, 2003; Kugler and Rapoport, 2007 and Murat and Pistoresi, 2009 among
others). The main mechanisms through which this association takes place are the
demand and the information channels. The former may occur when people living
abroad demand products or services from their home country and companies try to
satisfy these needs by investing abroad. The information channel is less straightfor-
ward but it seems to be particularly relevant for FDI decisions: Foreign investment
implies a long-term investment and therefore requires a wide variety of information
about the legal framework and business structure in the host country (Javorcik et al.,
2011). FDI also involves higher risk of expropriation and thus information about the
investment environment is more valuable (Leblang, 2011).
Migrants can also foster trust, especially in countries where the rule of law is
uncertain and doing business with foreigners entails a degree of insecurity (Mundra,
2014). As stated by Burchardi et al. (2016), individuals who have social ties may
generate a competitive advantage for the firms at which they work and the regions
where they live by reducing information frictions. Migrants may open new channels
for profitable investment through their networks with fellow professionals from their
home country. They can help companies to identify business opportunities, local
tastes and foreign preferences, and can even help investors find joint venture part-
ners. Accordingly, migrant networks seem to matter more for bilateral FDI than for
trade (Javorcik et al., 2011; Tong, 2005). Daude and Fratzscher (2008) emphasized
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that FDI flows are more sensitive to information frictions than investment portfolio
equity and debt securities. Cuadros et al. (2016) highlighted the role of migrants as
suppliers of financial information about their homeland. This type of knowledge may
be particularly relevant during periods of financial distress. The results obtained in-
dicate that migrants eased the credit constraints foreign investors faced during the
2007 financial crisis.
As information exchange is crucial for investment decisions, migrants’ personal
characteristics come to the forefront of the analysis, as they explain how migrants
participate in channeling this information. The existing migration-FDI studies that
controlled for migrants’ skills heterogeneity (which are summarized in Table 1) fo-
cused on educational attainment.1 The main idea highlighted by the studies shown
in Table 1 is that high-skilled migrants are expected to have a greater influence on
FDI as they bring with them higher levels of information and influence (Docquier
and Lodigiani, 2010). Well-educated individuals may have specialized knowledge
about how to conduct business with investors of their own particular ethnicity. They
also have the language skills and cultural sensitivity that would promote collabora-
tion with business developers in host countries. Skilled migrants are likely to have a
more in-depth understanding of customer behavior and to be able to provide insights
about the type of products that would generate higher levels of demand. This type
of migrants may even be personally involved in investments from their country of
origin, boosting capital flows (Foley and Kerr, 2013).
[Table 1 about here.]
However, the role played by migrants’ educational attainment is controversial,
to say the least. Thus, Felbermayr and Jung (2009) find that low- and high-skilled
1The only exception is Tomohara (2017a), who constructs two broad skill groups based on a
wide range of occupational categories for Japan only.
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migrants strongly boost bilateral trade while medium-skilled migration does not seem
to matter. This could be explained by the mismatch between formal educational
attainment and job skills, which is a common feature of the labor market in general
and seems to be particularly pronounced for migrants (Aleksynska and Tritah, 2013;
Chiswick and Miller, 2009b). The mismatch that occurs when a person has a level
of formal education above that required for her job is referred to as over-education,
and the opposite as under-education. Migrants are more likely than native-born
workers to be either under- or over-educated with respect to the jobs that they
hold. Saxenian (1999) provides casual evidence of this mismatch by showing that
the superior educational attainment of Silicon Valley’s Asian immigrants is only
partially reflected in their occupational status.
Our analysis is a novel attempt to provide a theoretical rationale for the role
played by migrants’ occupations in influencing FDI, with empirical evidence in a
multi-country gravity framework. Our empirical strategy relies on the evidence ob-
tained by a handful of studies which advocate using migrants’ job position rather than
education as a suitable proxy for the migrants’ effective job skill-sets and decision-
making power (Aleksynska and Peri, 2014; Mart́ın-Montaner et al., 2014). According
to these studies, migrants’ proximity to decision-making positions appears to have
a more crucial influence on international trade than their formal knowledge or abil-
ities: Occupations such as business directors or managers may play a particularly
important role in facilitating trade connections. Such professionals have a direct
role in channeling relevant information and knowledge of potential export markets
and import opportunities, as well as in facilitating the understanding of differences
in culture and business practices. As illustrated by Mundra (2014), an immigrant
who is a homemaker or a student might not participate in professional networking
or move in entrepreneurship circles, and will thus have a lower information effect on
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trade than an engineer or a CEO. Moreover, there will be a greater exchange of ideas
across managerial and professional immigrant groups, which increases the potential
for lowering transaction costs through access to more extensive information about
foreign markets as well as through personal business contacts.
We shed new light on several mechanisms that remain under-explored by previous
studies: the role played by migrants’ job positions, the direction of migration and
sectoral effects. First, the literature does not provide a conclusive picture of the
effects of i→j or j→i migration on i→j FDI flows. On the one hand, a higher presence
of i -born migrants in the host country of investment may attract new investment
projects to that country (see Buch et al. 2006; Foad 2012; Gheasi et al. 2013). On
the other hand, j -born migrants who live in the home country of investment may act
as ambassadors for prospective foreign investors in their homeland (see Kugler and
Rapoport 2007; Javorcik et al. 2011; Cuadros et al. 2016). To test the significance
of both mechanisms, both types of migrants have been included in our estimations.
Second, our analysis provides a plausible interpretation for a confusing finding
that the literature has largely swept under the rug. In Table 1, we have highlighted
those studies reporting a negative effect of low-skilled-migrants. Our model reconciles
theory with data by showing that what matters is the job skills composition of
migrant stock. Foreign affiliates face higher high-skilled labor costs (e.g., searching,
identification and communications costs) when management skills become relatively
less abundant.
Third, the effects of migrants’ job skills on FDI may also vary depending on the
activity at which the investment is targeted. This could be explained by the fact
that different types of FDI may require different types of skills according to their
main activity (e.g., extraction industries, manufacturing or provision of services; see
Checchi et al., 2007). Moreover, the determinants of foreign entry decisions may vary
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between services and manufacturing activities (Kolstad and Villanger, 2008). These
arguments suggest that it is appropriate to account for the specific activity at which
the FDI is targeted. To the best of our knowledge, within the migration-FDI literat-
ure, just a handful of studies have dealt with the sector composition of FDI. Kugler
and Rapoport (2007) find a dynamic complementary between skilled migration and
US outward FDI in services, and contemporaneous substitution between unskilled
migration and US outward FDI in manufacturing. Javorcik et al. (2011) examine
whether the positive relationship between migration and US FDI abroad that they
obtain at the aggregate level is also present at the industry level. A key outcome
of the model that we develop below is that the effect of migrant managers is more
intense in high-skilled activities.
3 Theoretical framework
3.1 Setup
The basic setup is a world of J countries with the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas




Tj , for a two-sector
economy with NT (non-traded) and T (traded) goods. The parameter µ is the share
of total spending Rj in each industry, which consists of a continuum of differentiated
products. The aggregate consumption in this sector is the sum of all goods produced.






, where σ ≡ (1− ι)−1 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between














Production is undertaken by price-taking firms in monopolistic competition. To
produce the good l, a firm z uses three inputs: capital K , skilled inputs or services
S (which are provided by high-skilled labor), and low-skilled inputs or services L
(which are provided by low-skilled labor). The firm combines high-skilled labor (e.g.,
management or engineering) with capital and low-skilled labor in a second step. To
model production, we use a Cobb-Douglas variant of a two-level CES production
function in the spirit of Krusell et al. (2000):
xjz(l) = S
s[KkLl]1−s, (1)
where the positive constants s < 1 and k + l < 1 measure the intensity with which
the inputs are used in production and are constant at the sectoral level.
Upon entry, the firm discovers its total factor productivity 1/α, where α is the
number of input units per input bundle used by the firm to produce one unit of
output. We follow the standard assumption that the distribution of α across firms
is continuous Pareto c.d.f. G(α) with [α, ᾱ]. The density of G(α) is denoted by g(α)
and the distribution is the same across countries.
To produce a good, a domestic firm incurs a marginal cost of:
ωDomj (α) ≡ α(w̄jS + rjK + wjL), (2)
where each unit of capital comes at a cost of rj > 1, which reflects the capital,
interest and search costs. The high-skilled and low-skilled labor costs (coordination
costs and wages) are, respectively, w̄j > wj > 1. This assumption is based on the
fact that management skills are relatively less abundant than low-skilled skill sets.
The firm incurs a fixed cost of production fj and sells its product at prices pj.
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Thus, the problem of the firm is:
max
K,S,L
πDomiz = max{pjSs[KkLl]1−s − ωDomj (α)− fj}. (3)
In equilibrium the market clears and the firm determines the optimal levels of





























where η = s− sk + l − ls+ k. 2
Equation (4) is in line with economic intuition, which would suggest that pro-
ductive firms (with lower α) in markets with higher demand and lower factor costs
tend to be larger in terms of capital.
The least productive firm determines the minimum capital required to enter the
market, which is KDomj (ᾱ). Firms that enter the market and discover that their
productivity is such that the capital is lower than KDomj (ᾱ) do not produce in that
market.
3.2.1 Foreign entry
Now let a foreign firm from country i enter the market in country j with an
affiliate that uses its headquarter’s blueprints to produce product l with domestic
capital and labor. The only difference between a domestic and a foreign firm is that
management is needed to translate blueprints and coordinate with the headquarters.
2In the online Appendix, we show the solution to all equations of the model.
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In this setup, the affiliate incurs a marginal cost of:
ωFDIij (α) ≡ α(w̄ijS + rjK + wjL) (5)
where w̄ij is the labor cost of high-skilled management to coordinate with the
headquarters (coordination, searching and wages). We assume that this specific
skill-set is relatively less abundant, meaning that w̄ij > w̄j. Intuitively, the affiliate
requires managers with certain coordination abilities and thus face high search and
attrition costs. Conversely, low-skilled labor is sourced locally from a pool of workers
with similar characteristics.








where ψij = w̄ij/w̄j > 1 is the ratio of high-skilled foreign managers to local man-
agement labor costs. Therefore, we can express the capital in terms of the minimum











Equation (7) imposes a productivity threshold of α∗ = ᾱ
ψsij
. Therefore, in line
with ample empirical evidence, for the same level of capital, foreign entry imposes
a productivity markup. Our model offers a new insight: the higher productivity
of foreign entrants holds only for skill-intensive sectors. In other sectors that rely
exclusively on low-skilled labor and capital (s → 0), foreign and domestic capital
and productivity are equal (for example farming).
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3.2.2 Multiple firms
The capital investment is defined as the sum of the capital invested from the most
























where Ni is the total number of firms in country i.
To calculate the foreign capital invested by foreign firms, we follow the assump-
tions of Helpman et al. (2008), adapted for FDI in Cuadros et al. (2016), to obtain
a log-linear and estimable equation from (8):
lnFDIij ≡ ln K̃ij = ni + kj −
s
1− η
lnψij + ωij, (9)
where ni = lnNi and kj = lnK
Dom
j (ᾱ) are home and host country fixed effects,
respectively, and parameter ω controls firm selection as in Helpman et al. (2008).
Equation 9 is effectively a gravity equation for foreign capital, where the total for-
eign capital investment is the result of home country fixed effects (the number of
firms or the country’s economic mass), a host country fixed effect (minimum capital
requirements determined by the host’s factor endowments and demand via prices),
a bilateral transaction cost (related to high-skilled labor costs) and selection into an
investment mechanism.
3.3 Migration
To obtain an empirical equation that allows us to estimate equation (9), we must
appropriately parametrize ψij. Affiliates need to hire skilled labor which is able to
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translate headquarters’ blueprints. Consequently, the parameter ψij captures labor
cost differences and communication costs between the affiliate and headquarters. The
assumption that ψij ≥ 1 comes from high-skilled labor cost differentials, which un-
fortunately are not directly observable to the econometrician. However, high-skilled
labor mobility has an effect on labor cost differentials and is directly observable.
Given a downward-sloping of labor demand curve, an increase in supply should be
expected to lower labor costs. Recent studies suggest that in terms of labor effects,
migrants particularly affect the labor costs (particularly wages) of previous migrants
(Borjas, 2017; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). Therefore, allowing for labor mobility
between country pairs3, an increase in the share of high-skilled i-born workers (with
management skills) in country j is expected to reduce the labor costs of high-skilled
managers wij as these high-level skills become more abundant.
Let us assume that the observed labor cost differential for managers increases
with the distance to the headquarters and is inversely proportional to the observed
stock of migrant managers, with some measurement error. The intuition here is that
the affiliate faces lower communication and labor search costs when the supply of






where υ > 0 is the foreign distance-wage elasticity, m̄ij > 0 is the bilateral stock of
migrants with management skills and ε is a stochastic error term. Let us represent
the total bilateral stock as
mij = m̄ij +mij = (1 + ζ)m̄ij, (11)
3Alternatively, the host country could impose a fee on foreign managers to train local workers
(Stark and Byra, 2018)
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where mij is the low-skilled migrant stock and ζ = mij/m̄ij is low-skilled to high-
skilled migrant ratio.
Therefore, an empirical equation to estimate is:








+ ωij + εij. (12)
The effects of skill shifting in the migration stock follow naturally from equation
(12). For a fixed total migrant stock, an exogenous increase in the share of high-
skilled migrants (i.e., lower ζ) increases bilateral FDI. Conversely, an increase in
low-skilled immigrant share (i.e., higher ζ) reduces the volume of bilateral FDI.
It is interesting to note that parameter ψij affects both the capital invested (in-
tensive margin) and the productivity threshold (extensive margin). Therefore, we
should expect that an increase in high-skilled migration reduces the productivity
threshold α∗. Thus, the share of migrants with management skills, has a positive
effect on both investment margins.
4 Data and Econometric Specification
A näıve gravity augmented empirical gravity equation of (9) would take the form:
lnFDIijt = β1gravityijt + β2gravityij + β3 lnmanagerijt + γit + γjt + uijt (13)
where FDIijt is the aggregate capital expenditure on foreign projects from country
i to country j in year t ; gravityijt and gravityij is a standard set of time-varying
and time-invariant gravity control variables, respectively; managerijt, represents the
stock of people born in country i working in country j as managers. Lastly, γ refers
to country-year fixed effects to control for multilateral resistance (time-varying third-
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country effects) and u is a stochastic error term. The FDI source country (i) matches
the migrant’s country of origin; and the FDI recipient country (j ) is the migrant’s
host country.4
The baseline gravity equation (13) suffers from several biases. In the first place,
omitted variable bias occurs since we do not control for other types of job skills
included in the total migrant stock. Therefore, an appropriate empirical specification
should simultaneously control for all types of migration. Inferences from regressions
that introduce separately the two types of migrants are difficult to interpret. For
example, one cannot be sure that a positive sign on low-skilled migration can be a
confounding effect of increasing high-skilled migration.
The second set of potential biases are related to the gravity specification of (13).
The log version of the gravity equation has a self-selection bias, which stems from
the omission of zeros. Additionally, the estimation of FDI capital expenditure flows
suffers a potential over-aggregation bias. We adopt different empirical strategies to
hedge against these empirical issues. Silva and Tenreyro (2015) show that Helpman et
al.’s (2008) two-stage estimation imposes overly strict homoscedasticity restrictions
on the error term. As an alternative, the authors show that the simpler Pseudo-
Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method yields similar results to the two-step
procedure. To overcome this issue, we use a non-linear variant of the gravity equation
in line with that proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), which does not require a
log-linearization. Therefore, we use the following non-linear specification for the






β2 lnmanagerijt + β3 ln professionalijt + β4 lnnonqualijt+
γit + γjt + γij
+ uijt
(14)
where managerijt, professionalijt, and nonqualijt represent the stock of people born
in country i working in country j as managers, professionals and non-qualified work-
ers respectively6, BIT is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country
pair has a bilateral investment treaty in force, and FTA is a dummy variable that
indicates whether both countries have a free trade agreement in force.
Equation (13) controls for potential estimation biases such as unobserved bilat-
eral heterogeneity, multilateral resistance terms, zero trade flows or heteroscedastic
residuals. The estimation strategy follows the recent proposal by Larch et al. (2017)
which, through an iterative PPML algorithm, allows us to account for all the above
issues and deals efficiently with high-dimensional fixed effects: country-pair, source-
time and destination-time fixed effects.
As in similar studies, the migrant source data is taken from the DIOC-E data-
base on migrants in OECD and non-OECD countries (Dumont and Widmaier, 2010),
which constrains the analysis to 91 source countries and 24 host economies (the com-
plete list is reported in the Online Appendix). The DIOC-E provides information
about the percentage of migrants in occupations such as business directors or man-
agers, who are more directly related to the creation of international linkages and
investment opportunities abroad. The BIT and FTA agreements are sourced from
5The equation for the extensive margin follows the same specification, but substituting the
left-hand-side variable for the number of firm-level projects.
6With this specification, we are controlling for the share of each skill group in line with our
model.
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UNCTAD and FDI data come from FDIMarkets.7
The migrant data refer to the years 2001 and 2004 and provide information about
migrants’ job positions. As in similar studies, we apply a three-year lag (2004 and
2007) to the FDI data to reduce the potential bias of reverse causality (Bratti et al.,
2014; Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010). We apply also several instrumental variable
techniques to rule out potential endogeneity bias.
Certain aspects of the data on the stock of migrants should be noted. DIOC-E
uses the standard 2-digit ISCO-88 classification for all but three countries (Argentina,
Turkey and the United States). In order to keep the United States in the sample,
categories from ISCO-88 and US were aggregated up to the three broad groups
used in equation (14): non-qualified, non-managerial qualified and managers. It is
worth emphasizing two issues regarding these categories. First, ISCO-88 categories
are defined by the skills required for each job regardless of the way those skills were
acquired. Second, the categories refer to the tasks associated with the job rather than
the employer/employee status of the person carrying them out. More specifically, the
three categories defined by aggregating the 2-digit ISCO-88 are described in Table
(2).
[Table 2 about here.]
In Table 3 we list the host countries in the sample and some statistics about the
distribution of migrants in the different job positions by countries of origin. The
distribution of migrants across job positions is fairly even across countries, with
approximately 12% of migrants working in managerial positions (on average), 30%
as professionals and almost 60% in non-qualified jobs. These figures hold remarkably
7The data allow us to directly observe the extensive margin with firm-level data. Therefore,
we do not need to estimate the two-step HMR equation since the selection mechanism ωij of our
empirical equation is directly present in the extensive margin. Additionally, Silva and Tenreyro
(2015) argue that the HMR two-step estimation method has certain limitations which the PPML
estimator overcomes.
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well not only for migration flows from the investing country towards the FDI recipient
country but also for flows in the opposite direction.
[Table 3 about here.]
We estimate equation (14) for both the intensive (FDI flows) and the extensive
margin (number of projects). The PPML estimator is a way of dealing with known
gravity estimation issues such as the presence of zeros in the dependent variable and
heteroscedasticity. The dataset is unbalanced with 70% zeros. Therefore, we follow
Paniagua (2016) to construct efficient gravity datasets with many zeros.
A relevant question is whether migration can be treated as exogenous. Rose
(2018) and Beverelli et al. (2018) argue that the inclusion of time-varying country
fixed effects reduces the potential endogeneity for dyadic data. Following their argu-
ments, the multilateral resistance terms eliminate the effect of any specific economic
phenomena in a particular country, such an increase in the migration rate. The eco-
nomic argument is that the gravity equation controls for both monadic (which we
do not estimate) and dyadic migration.
Nonetheless, we take some precautions to mitigate a possible endogeneity bias.
In the first place, our econometric specification measures FDI in flows and migration
in lagged stocks. It is very unlikely that the 4-year lagged migration stock has an
effect on future FDI flows. However, to rule out the concern of double causality in
our estimates, we perform several additional tests based on an instrumental variable
approach, which we detail with the results reported below.
Alongside endogeneity, lies the issue of identification or perhaps omitted variable
bias, which remains in the error term. The inclusion of country-pair fixed effects
should help with the correct identification of migrants in the equation. However, we
try to corroborate the robustness of the results with an extensive set of robustness
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checks. In particular, we introduce ji migrants to control for the information chan-
nel, as in Javorcik et al. (2011) and Cuadros et al. (2016). We also use an alternative
specification measuring migrants in shares rather than in logs.8 Additionally, we con-
trol for other sources of heterogeneity with a gravity quantile regression (Paniagua
et al., 2015) and a sectoral analysis. Finally, we compare job position and educa-
tional attainment to determine the best measure to estimate the effects modeled in
our theoretical framework.
Lastly, our micro-founded model assumes Pareto-distributed productivities to
close the gap between the Melitz framework and the gravity equation. Since Chaney
(2008), many related studies have taken a similar route, at the risk of a disconnec-
tion between theory and empirics. Furthermore, we do not have employee-employer
matched data. Unfortunately, our dataset does not contain detailed information
indicating whether migrants with managerial jobs are employed by multinationals.
Acknowledging all these issues, we are accordingly cautious in interpreting the results
of the empirical analysis presented below.
5 Results
The gravity estimates reported in Table 4 constitute our baseline results. The
first four columns show the results for aggregate FDI flows (intensive margin) and
the last four are those corresponding to the explanation of the extensive margin.
[Table 4 about here.]
We start by analyzing the determinants of the investment decision (extensive
margin). Our estimation procedure forces us to drop traditional invariant variables
8The results for migrant shares are reported in the Online Appendix
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included in gravity equations, with the exception of bilateral agreements, which
displays heterogeneous effects.9
Let us focus on the effects of migrants occupying different job positions. In our
first estimates, we consider only one job position in each equation, as displayed in
columns (1) to (3) in the intensive margin and columns (5) to (7) in the extensive
margin. All categories are found to be highly significant for both dependent variables.
Besides, the highest impact comes from management skills, followed by profession-
als and low-skilled workers. This decreasing pattern can be seen in the estimates
for both margins. This outcome is not entirely satisfying from our theoretical per-
spective, since we expected opposite impacts of migrants on FDI depending on their
skills and job positions. Besides, as discussed in Section 4 and from an econometric
perspective, these results do not control for job skill composition adequately since
each individual estimate does not include the number of migrants in the rest of the
job categories.10 The inclusion of all three variables simultaneously in columns (4)
and (8) could block the effect of the omitted categories. This specification reveals
that migrants in non-qualified positions do not significantly affect FDI in either mar-
gin, whereas professionals become non-significant only in the intensive margin. To
rule out confounding effects, we re-estimate our baseline model controlling for the
aggregate migrant stock in the remaining positions as in equation (14). This spe-
cification amounts to an analysis of the impact of the share of each job category, as
in Aleksynska and Peri (2014) and Javorcik et al. (2011). The results are displayed
in Table 5 only for our variables of interest.
[Table 5 about here.]
9Paniagua et al. (2015) show that the unexpected effect of BIT on FDI is explained by firm-
heterogeneity bias. To overcome this bias, the authors develop a quantile regression procedure.
10As the number of individuals from country i working in country j is distributed across all the
job positions, they could all increase or decrease simultaneously in this specification.
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Some interesting differences emerge in the impact of migrants depending on the
job categories, as can be seen in Table 5. On the one hand, the effect of managers
is always significant and positive, whereas in the case of professionals we do not find
any significant influence. On the other hand, migrants in non-qualified jobs display
a negative effect only in the extensive margin (column 6). These results are in line
with our hypothesis regarding the key role of migrants with management skills, but
also with our view of the impact of low-skilled migrants. The negative effect of non-
qualified migrants on FDI is not new in the literature (as shown in Table 1), although
explanations for this puzzling result offered by previous studies have been ad-hoc at
best.11 However, this negative impact a predicted outcome of our model. All else
being equal, an increase in non-qualified migrants results in a decrease in the share
of managers and professionals (captured by ζ in equation 12).
Viewed from another angle, increasing the share of non-qualified migrants in-
creases the management costs ψij. The intuition being that this cost stems from
scarcity but also from difficulties in identifying migrants endowed with informational
skills (managers and, to a lesser extent, professionals). It is precisely the shift in the
skills composition that affects FDI.
Moving forward, our model studies the contribution of ij migrant stock to the
ij FDI flows via high-skilled labor cost differentials. However, the model is agnostic
as to the effect of the ji migrant stock since we modeled production located in
country j. Nevertheless, previous research (see Cuadros et al. (2016); Javorcik et al.
(2011) among others) has highlighted the impact of the informational flows provided
by ji migrants on FDI flows. In our framework, this type of migrants represent an
11According to Flisi and Murat (2011), this negative relationship could be interpreted as a
substitution effect between low-skilled migrants and FDI abroad. In a previous version of that
work, the authors stated that this negative sign could be reflecting the preference of the firms from
the migrants’ countries of origin to invest in countries with a greater presence of skilled nationals
and business networks. Gheasi et al. (2013) also report a negative influence of low-skilled migrants,
albeit with no convincing explanation.
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exogenous information channel, which we want to empirically control for in order to
reduce omitted variable bias.
To take into account these effects, we introduce the stock of ji migrants by
means of the specification already used in Table 5. The new outcomes appear in
Table 6. As expected, the new variable is significant in both margins and refines
the mechanisms highlighted by the aforementioned research. Only the information
provided by j -born migrant managers seems to influence both the decision to invest
as well as the amount invested.
[Table 6 about here.]
The estimates for the job categories indicators are not qualitatively different
from those displayed in Table 5, as they retain their sign and significance. However,
in quantitative terms, the impact of all the indicators increases significantly. One
possible interpretation, other than a country selection bias due to the reduced number
of observations, might rest on a positive feedback process between different migrants.
Additionally, we can better understand the role played by both types of migrants
in FDI. On the one hand, j→i migrants provide a signal about which locations to
invest in. This signal is only relevant for migrant managers. On the other hand, in
addition to possible information signals, the effect of i→j migrants encompasses both
managers and professionals, who can reduce production labor costs, as predicted by
our model.
5.1 Sources of FDI heterogeneity
Next, we tighten our specification by introducing two sources of heterogeneity
in the dependent variable. Thus, we distinguish FDI (i) by the branch of activity
(Table 7) and (ii) by the level of investment, which is likely to be highly correlated
with firm size (Table 8).
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With regard to the first distinction, we split our dependent variable into four
possible activities at which the investment project might be targeted: Manufacturing,
Sales, Construction and Services. A key element of our model is that the effect
of the share of migrant managers would be more intense in sectors that are more
dependent on high-skilled inputs (s  0). The high level of aggregation makes it
difficult to identify the high-skill intensive activities; however, the decomposition
into four branches allows us to test our theoretical predictions and draw interesting
conclusions from the outcomes presented in Table 7.
First, managers appear as the primary source of impact on FDI, confirming the
need for migrants to be close to decision-making positions if they are to have any
influence on FDI. Second, this influence shows different patterns across branches
and allows us to clarify the effects of both types of migrants. On the one hand, the
information provided by j→i migrants focuses on construction and manufacturing
activities, where local knowledge is relevant to choose the best manufacturing loca-
tions and compete for construction contracts. On the other hand, the effect of i→j
migrants is concentrated in sales (managers and professionals), and services (man-
agers). These high-skill intensive activities benefit from imported talent to overcome
the difficulties involved in relocating production to country j.
[Table 7 about here.]
To control for the second source of heterogeneity, we rely on the level of the invest-
ment, which is likely to be associated with the size of the investing firm. We employ
quantile regressions, which are appropriate for the estimation of skewed data such
as that on international trade (Baltagi and Egger, 2016; Machado et al., 2016) and
FDI (Myburgh and Paniagua, 2016; Paniagua et al., 2015). We follow Baker’s (2014)
procedure to fit a censored quantile regression model, with investments considered
separately depending on the amount invested (i.e., only accounting for the intensive
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margin) and the results conditional on the values of the migration indicator. The
results are presented in Table 8.12
[Table 8 about here.]
As expected, managers have a higher impact on the lowest levels of FDI, popu-
lated by smaller firms. The positive effect of managers decreases with FDI quantiles,
while the negative effect of low-skilled migrants increases (becomes more negative).
This opposing trend is in line with our model where the negative effect of low-skilled
migrants is due to the migrant job skills composition. Therefore, in those levels of
FDI where management skills have a lower impact, the negative effect of low-skilled
migrants emerges as a consequence of the relative composition of migrants’ jobs skills.
5.2 Job position vs. educational attainment
We have previously discussed in Section 2 the problems associated with the use of
educational attainment as a measure of migrants’ skills. For the sake of comparison,
however, we replicate our estimates shown in Tables 6 and 7, substituting our job
position indicators with traditional indicators of educational attainment.13
However, this does not mean that we establish a one-to-one equivalence between
these levels of education and our job categories. First, it is likely that most migrants
would have secondary or higher educational levels (in fact, higher-educated migra-
tion has grown steadily in the last decade). Second, many of these higher-educated
migrants might not be working in managerial or professional positions; on the con-
trary, a high proportion may be occupying non-qualified positions (Arslan et al.,
2015; Widmaier and Dumont, 2011). Third, Hartog and Zorlu (2009) report that
12Due to convergence issues, we controlled for country-pair heterogeneity with the time-invariant
controls detailed in the online Appendix
13In the online Appendix, we replicate all the empirical analysis with educational attainment
and provide further evidence.
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higher education does not provide the expected returns on a migrant’s salary, thus
reducing the educational incentives of prospective migrants.
Table 9 reports the educational results. In this specification, we observe evident
differences with the results of Table 6. Here only highly-educated i→j migrants
have a positive and significant impact on both margins, which is consistent with i→j
migrant managers and professionals having a positive impact in Table 6. But the
results regarding the information signal provided by j→i migrants are mixed. For the
intensive margin, no educational level seems to be significant.14 For the extensive
margin, the effect of primary education cancels out that of secondary education.
Recalling the results in Table 6, j→i migrant managers had a consistent positive
effect. The economic interpretation of these results might suggest that only the
information signal of i→j migrants with significant corporate responsibility emerges
above the noise level.
Overall, these results align with those of Hartog and Zorlu (2009), who reported
the low influence of educational level on migrants’ salaries. Migrants seem to exert a
more intense influence on FDI when their education allows them to work in decision-
making occupations. Chiswick and Miller (2009a) posit that earnings appear to be
more closely related to a worker’s occupation than to the individual level of schooling.
Therefore, when we assess migrants by their occupation rather than by education,
we can be confident of correctly capturing the high-skilled labor cost ratio.
These results uncover a relevant message. Migrants’ educational skills are un-
doubtedly important to foster FDI flows. However, within the stock of skilled mi-
grants, those occupying a certain type of job positions facilitate FDI. This would
support our hypothesis that the distribution across job categories is the best way to
account for migrants’ heterogeneity.
14However, this appears to be an artifact of collinearity, because when we aggregated them in
the online Appendix, we observed a mild positive effect.
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[Table 9 about here.]
5.3 Endogeneity
Several studies that deal with migrant endogeneity have used different instru-
ments such as passport costs (Hatzigeorgiou, 2010), dual citizenship (Mundra, 2014)
and ancestors (Burchardi et al., 2016). We use these instruments in a step-wise man-
ner that allows us to differentiate between skilled (managers and professionals) and
non-skilled migrants.
Current migration can be related back to historical migration patterns (Burchardi
et al., 2016; Card, 2001; Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010). However, historical migra-
tion distribution should have a weak relationship with present FDI flows. Therefore,
we use as an instrument the proportion of the ancestors from 1500, defined as the
share of the population in year 2000 in every host country (Putterman and Weil,
2010). We also add as an instrument a dummy variable which captures the pos-
sibility that the home country allows for dual citizenship, as in Mundra (2014). To
differentiate between skill endowments, in addition to ancestors and dual citizenship,
we instrument non-qualified workers with passport costs as a percentage of gross na-
tional income (Hatzigeorgiou, 2010). Passports might be a strong barrier for the
low-income level migrants but not for managers and professionals.
[Table 10 about here.]
The results are shown in Table 10. The instrumental variable two-set least-squares
(IV-2SLS) regression results do not deviate substantially from our previous standard
regression results. The Hansen J statistic suggests that risk of over-identification
is relatively low (except for professionals in the extensive margin). The signs and
relative magnitudes of the estimated coefficients for the different occupations are in
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line with our expectations both in the extensive and extensive margins. Management
skills have a positive and significant effect on FDI, which is bigger than the effect of
professionals. Non-qualified migrants have a negative and significant effect on FDI,
after controlling for other job skills.
For robustness, we used the poisson IV version, as it allows for multiplicative
errors, which better fits dyadic data (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The results are re-
ported in Table 11. The magnitude of the coefficients has been considerably reduced
with respect to the 2SLS linear version and are in line with our previous estimates.
Managers emerge as the most important job category in both margins, and non-qual
retains the negative sign in the intensive margin. Professionals do not seem to have
a significant effect on FDI, after controlling for endogeneity with this procedure.
[Table 11 about here.]
6 Concluding remarks
This paper disentangles some unexplored mechanisms behind the migration-FDI
nexus. We provide theoretical and empirical arguments to highlight the relevance of
job skills in an analysis of how migration impacts FDI flows. The model boils down
to a key insight: migrants with jobs that entail decision-making foster FDI.
Our empirical findings show that migrant managers in particular, and to a lesser
extent professionals, exert a positive and significant influence on both the extensive
and the intensive margins of FDI. Moreover, the results reveal sectoral heterogeneity.
Our analysis also illustrates that the effects are larger for the lower levels of FDI,
populated by smaller investment projects, where management skills might be more
useful.
The paper also tackles an issue that has been overlooked by the literature: the
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heterogeneous impact of different migration flows. Now we can better understand
the role played by both types of migrants: the empirical exercise suggests that j→i
migrants reduce information asymmetries and j→i have labor-related effects.
One novelty of our analysis is to provide a rationale for the puzzling negative
effect of non-qualified migrants on FDI. This negative effect is only perceptible after
controlling for the rest of the job skill-sets, suggesting that the marginal effect of non-
qualified migration is explained by a change in the job skills composition. The robust
structural gravity estimates reveal a consistent partial equilibrium effect of decision-
making migrants on FDI. Policies aimed at fostering FDI might want to consider
these insights, for example by promoting management training for migrants. Future
studies could use the insights of this paper to assess the general equilibrium effects
of such policies.
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Table 1: Literature review summary
STUDY COUNTRY / PERIOD MAIN RESULTS
Kugler and Rapoport (2007) United States 1990 and 2000
Higher unskilled emigration in 1990 is associated with
higher growth of total FDI inflows over the following
decade.
Negative impact for migrants with secondary
education in the manufacturing sector
Docquier and Lodigiani (2010)
Cross section 114 countries. Panel data/ 83
countries
Strong network externalities mainly associated with
the skilled diaspora
Ivlevs and De Melo (2010) 1990-2000 103 migration-sending countries
If exports are low skill intensive, emigration of
high-skilled labour leads to positive FDI
Flisi and Murat (2011)
Immigrant networks for France, Germany,
UK, Italy and Spain
Skilled immigrants increase bilateral FDI in UK,
France and Germany. In Italy and Spain, FDI is
influenced by their emigrant diaspora network.
Negative impact for unskilled migrants:
substitution effect between low-skilled immigration and
investment abroad
Javorcik et al. (2011) United States 1990 and 2000
Outward FDI (stock) positively related with the
presence of migrants in US (stock).
Stronger effect for the share of tertiary educated
migrants
Leblang (2011)
26 OECD reporting countries and 120
destination countries 2000 and 2001
Migrant networks encourage cross-border investments
(FDI and portfolio).
The effect on FDI is substantially larger. Stronger for
migrants with tertiary education
Foad (2012)
50 US states, 10 source countries 1990 and
2000 for immigration
Presence of immigrants leads to new FDI from
immigrants’ native countries.
This effect is stronger for skilled migrants and might
take a few years to occur
Gheasi et al. (2013) United Kingdom 2001-2007
FDI abroad positively related with the presence of
migrants. More educated migrants have a higher
positive effect on FDI.
Negative impact of low-skilled migrants on FDI
Tomohara (2017b) Japan 1996-2011 FDI inflows become more dominant compared to
imports when skilled immigration flows increase and
less dominant when unskilled immigration flows
increase
Tomohara (2017a) Japan 1996-2011 Contemporaneous negative relationship
between low-skilled migration and FDI
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Table 2: 2-digit ISCO-8
variables 2-digit ISCO-8
manager Legislators, senior officials and managers
professional
Professionals
Technicians and associate professionals
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers
Craft and related trade workers





Table 3: Migrant shares in the sample
Emigrants (i→ j) Immigrants (j → i)
Country (i) Total Managers Professionals Non-qual Total Managers Professionals Non-qual
Australia 0.03 0.16 0.22 0.62 0.24 0.08 0.28 0.64
Austria 0.04 0.12 0.25 0.63 0.14 0.09 0.34 0.57
Belgium 0.04 0.14 0.22 0.63 0.10 0.20 0.22 0.57
Canada 0.05 0.14 0.33 0.52 0.21 0.10 0.24 0.66
Switzerland 0.07 0.14 0.25 0.60 0.25 0.06 0.51 0.43
Czech Rep 0.02 0.11 0.26 0.63 0.04 0.15 0.23 0.62
Denmark 0.03 0.16 0.27 0.58 0.06 0.01 0.61 0.38
Spain 0.02 0.14 0.30 0.55 0.07 0.10 0.39 0.50
Finland 0.06 0.07 0.31 0.62 0.02 0.02 0.43 0.55
France 0.03 0.13 0.27 0.59 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.64
UK 0.07 0.15 0.24 0.60 0.09 0.16 0.29 0.55
Greece 0.06 0.14 0.43 0.43 0.14 0.11 0.36 0.53
Hungary 0.04 0.11 0.29 0.60 0.03 0.14 0.22 0.65
Ireland 0.21 0.15 0.31 0.54 0.12 0.13 0.32 0.54
Italy 0.05 0.11 0.37 0.52 0.05 0.10 0.33 0.57
Luxembourg 0.09 0.13 0.25 0.63 0.43 0.10 0.28 0.62
Mexico 0.12 0.03 0.57 0.40 0.00 0.19 0.30 0.50
Netherlands 0.03 0.17 0.22 0.61 0.10 0.04 0.30 0.66
New Zealand 0.17 0.13 0.26 0.62 0.20 0.12 0.32 0.56
Poland 0.07 0.04 0.34 0.62 0.01 0.13 0.14 0.73
Portugal 0.15 0.10 0.33 0.57 0.09 0.12 0.29 0.60
Slovakia 0.08 0.08 0.27 0.65 0.03 0.13 0.25 0.62
Sweden 0.02 0.14 0.31 0.55 0.11 0.03 0.50 0.48
United States 0.01 0.16 0.17 0.67 0.14 0.09 0.42 0.50
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Table 4: Baseline Results
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
BIT ijt 0.161 0.223 0.059 0.187 0.085 0.126 0.093 0.048
(0.16) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
FTAijt 0.340
∗ 0.327∗ 0.397∗∗ 0.382∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
lnmanagerijt 0.476
∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.17) (0.03) (0.08)
ln professionalsijt 0.410
∗∗∗ -0.139 0.267∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗
(0.05) (0.19) (0.02) (0.10)
lnnonqualijt 0.346
∗∗∗ -0.049 0.243∗∗∗ -0.033
(0.05) (0.13) (0.02) (0.06)
Observations 1660 1735 1691 1625 1660 1735 1691 1625
R2 0.862 0.871 0.863 0.869 0.926 0.914 0.902 0.927
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (PPML estimation in levels) clustered by country pair.
Home*year and source*year country fixed and country-pair effects included.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Results controlling for other jobs
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Managers 0.667∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.08)








Other jobs 0.340∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.04)
Observations 1625 1625 1625 1625 1625 1625
R2 0.863 0.872 0.864 0.925 0.912 0.913
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (PPML estimation in levels) clustered by country pair.
Home*year and source*year country fixed and country-pair effects included.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Results controlling for other jobs and j→i migrants
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
(1) (2)
Managers i→j 1.057∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.11)
Professionals i→j 0.532∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.14)
Non-qualified i→j -0.292∗ -0.163∗
(0.17) (0.10)
Managers j→i 0.961∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.12)
Professionals j→i -0.472 -0.143
(0.37) (0.18)




Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (PPML estimation in levels) clustered by country pair.
Home*year and source*year country fixed and country-pair effects included.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Results controlling for other jobs and other migrants
Manufacturing Sales Construction Services
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Managers i→j 0.464 1.292∗∗∗ 0.149 0.859∗∗
(0.31) (0.41) (0.42) (0.38)
Professionals i→j -0.656 1.421∗ -0.039 -0.778
(0.42) (0.73) (0.58) (0.48)
Non-qualified i→j 0.134 0.456 0.119 0.085
(0.34) (0.48) (0.34) (0.33)
Managers j→i 0.880∗ -0.172 0.800∗ -0.042
(0.52) (0.49) (0.47) (0.51)
Professionals j→i 0.256 -0.481 -0.889 0.856
(0.67) (0.61) (0.63) (0.69)
Non-qualified j→i -0.495 0.652∗ 0.478 -0.291
(0.38) (0.35) (0.41) (0.43)
Observations 585 543 354 530
R2 0.834 0.874 0.584 0.582
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (PPML estimation in levels) clustered by country pair.
Home*year and source*year country fixed and country-pair effects included.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Quantile regression
Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) Q(0.90)
Average project size (mUSD): 14 28 61 79
Managers 0.933*** 0.818*** 0.342*** 0.363***
(0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.10)
Other jobs -0.454*** -0.346*** -0.067 -0.141*
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Migrants j→i 0.677*** 0.631*** 0.409*** 0.483***
(0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
Professionals 0.544*** 0.307*** 0.544*** 0.254*
(0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13)
Other jobs 0.006 -0.184** -0.121 0.029
(0.13) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Migrants j→i 0.596*** 0.343*** 0.335*** 0.485***
(0.10) (0.12) (0.05) (0.10)
Non-qual -0.263*** -0.581*** -0.540*** -0.814***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Other jobs 0.141** 0.430*** 0.338*** 0.566***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Migrants j→i 0.621*** 0.471*** 0.528*** 0.333***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10)
Observations 269 269 269 269
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (Dep variable ln(FDI + 1)).
Home*year and source*year country fixed effects included.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Results controlling for other education levels and other migrants
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
(1) (2)
Higher edu i→j 0.583∗∗∗ 0.192∗
(0.21) (0.11)
Secondary edu i→j -0.168 0.057
(0.21) (0.12)
Primary edu i→j -0.002 -0.088
(0.11) (0.07)
Higher edu j→i 0.190 -0.101
(0.18) (0.08)
Secondary edu j→i 0.011 0.331∗∗
(0.29) (0.13)




Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (PPML estimation in levels) clustered by country pair.
Home*year and source*year country fixed and country-pair effects included.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Endogeneity (2SLS)
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Managers 3.167*** 1.237**
(1.02) (0.49)








Other jobs 1.466*** 0.471***
(0.27) (0.10)
Observations 998 998 998 998 998 998
R2 0.45 0.48 0.23 0.60 0.27 0.27
Hansen J statistic 5.30* 8.5* 5.38* 3.81* 6.82*** 4.34
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country pair. Dependent variables+1 in logs
Instruments: Ancestors (j), Dual citizenship (i). For non-qual Passport cost (% GNI) is added.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Endogeneity (IV-poisson)
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Managers 0.537∗ 0.571∗
(0.30) (0.32)








Other jobs 0.389∗ 0.329
(0.27) (0.49)
Observations 746 746 746 746 746 746
Hansen J statistic 3.74∗∗ 2.84∗ 13.73∗∗∗ 1.16 0.53 3.09
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country pair. Dependent in levels
Instruments: Ancestors (j), Dual citizenship (i). For non-qual Passport cost (% GNI) is added.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
45
Online Appendix
Migration and FDI: The role of job skills
Ana Cuadros1,2, Joan Mart́ın-Montaner1,2, and Jordi Paniagua∗3,2
1Universitat Jaume I




Using a multi-country gravity framework, this paper models and quantifies
the relevance of migrants’ job position in fostering Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI). High-skilled migrants are defined as those individuals born in the in-
vestors’ home/host country occupying managerial or professional positions in
the host/home country of investment. Our estimates show that higher shares
of migrants with management skills in a given country promote FDI into that
country. In contrast, an increase in the share of migrants in non-qualified
positions (regardless of their educational attainment) has a negative impact
on FDI decisions. These findings highlight that the FDI-enhancing effect of
migrants is related to a shift in their skill composition due to their occupation.
We test our model on a new global panel data set of Greenfield bilateral invest-
ment with a wide variety of specifications, both at the extensive and intensive
margins. Additionally, we provide new insights into the mechanisms by which
migration influences FDI flows, with particular attention to the relevance of
FDI level and activity.
Keywords: Skilled migration; Foreign Direct Investment; Job skills; Gravity
equation; Extensive and Intensive Margins.




This technical appendix contains additional theoretical and empirical material
that complements the results shown in the paper “Migration and FDI: The role of
job skills”. In Section 2, we present a detailed analysis of the solution of our model,
which includes the full set of derivations. In Section 3, we provide additional data
and empirical robustness analyses. Table A1 presents the list of countries used both
in the main paper and in this Appendix.
[Table A.1 about here.]
2 Additional theoretical analyses
In the paper, we describe the main elements and assumptions of our theoretical
model and report the main theoretical results. In this section, we explain in detail
how those results have been derived.
2.1 Solution of the model for capital
We start by deriving the first-order conditions of the firm’ problem:
max
K,S,L





s−1[KkLl]1−s = αw̄j (A.1)
∂πDomiz
∂K
= (k − sk)pjSsGk−sk−1Ll−sl = αrj (A.2)
∂πDomiz
∂L












S−sK−k+sk+1 = αw̄j, (A.5)




















K−k+skL−l+sl+1Kk−sk−1Ll−sl = αrj (A.8)










































































































































2.2 Solution for labor





























3 Additional empirical analyses
We start our robustness checks by reporting the results that replace country-pair
fixed effects with an array of constant country-pair variables. Table A2 describes the
gravity controls and the source of each variable. Table A3 reports the descriptive
statistics and correlations of the data.
[Table A.2 about here.]
[Table A.3 about here.]
The gravity estimates are reported in Table A4. The first four columns show
the results for aggregate FDI flows (intensive margin) and the last four are those
corresponding to the explanation of the extensive margin.
[Table A.4 about here.]
We start by analyzing the determinants of the investment decision (extensive
margin). Our results are consistent with those obtained by previous studies estimat-
ing a gravity equation for FDI. The market size has the standard positive effect on
the dependent variables, whereas geographical obstacles such as distance and one of
the countries being landlocked display a standard negative impact (however, sharing
a border is not relevant). On the cultural side, the investment decision is positively
affected by the existence of a common language or past political links such as a
A5
former colonial relationship. Finally, the existence of bilateral agreements displays
heterogeneous effects.1 The outcomes for the intensive margin are quite similar to
those for the extensive margin, although the impact of distance seems less clear in
this case. Sharing a common language is not significant in any case.
Regarding the variables of interest, we observe few differences with the results
reported in the paper. The most evident one is the negative effect of non-qualified
jobs, which here is negative and significant when all categories are included (columns
4 and 8). However, in the results reported in Table 4 of the paper, we do observe a
negative and significant effect on non-qual jobs on the extensive margin only.
In order to confirm the validity of the results of the paper, we try an alternative
specification following Aleksynska and Peri (2014) and Javorcik et al. (2011). Thus,
in the estimates displayed in Table A5, we introduce separately shares of managers,
professionals and non-qualified migrants together with the total stock of migrants.
This latter variable absorbs omitted variables that affect both FDI and total migra-
tion, enabling us to single out the direct effect of migrants in each job position on
FDI.2
[Table A.5 about here.]
The total stock of migrants coming from the investing country is significant in
all cases, as expected. More interestingly, the share of migrants in managerial pos-
itions displays a positive and significant impact, whereas the share of non-qualified
migrants has a negative effect on the extensive margin, confirming the existence of
1Paniagua et al. (2015) state that the negative effect of BIT is explained by firm-heterogeneity
bias. To overcome this bias, the authors develop a quantile regression procedure. Furthermore, this
bias is corrected with the country-pair fixed effects.
2Additionally, this specification allows us to distinguish between Mundra’s (2010) information
and demand channels. Thus, the migrant share measures the information channel. The migrant
stock controls for the demand channel, through which FDI can be attracted by the demand for
goods and services from the migrants’ country of origin created by the stock of migrants from that
country.
A6
the composition effect mentioned above.
3.1 Educational Attainment vs. Jobs Positions
Most previous studies have quantified migrants’ capacities and skills through their
educational attainment. Our robustness analysis here considers three categories of
migrants’ educational level: primary, secondary and higher education.
Several of the considerations regarding the education-occupation mismatch can be
traced out in the outcomes presented in tables of this sub-section, where we replicate
our results for job occupations displayed in the main paper. Thus, the positive and
significant impact reported for higher-educated migrants in Table A6 is consistent
with the impacts corresponding to managers and professionals, and in line with the
assumption that most managers and professionals are highly-qualified. We find mixed
evidence regarding the effect of migrants with a less advanced level of schooling: the
impact of secondary-educated migrants is positive only on the intensive margin and
non-significant on the extensive margin, whereas migrants with primary studies do
not have any effect on either of them.
[Table A.6 about here.]
Table A7 presents the results for the quantile regression. These outcomes do not
seem to improve our understanding of the link between our educational indicators
and FDI. As we can see, the impact of higher educational levels is positive and
significant for most of the investments, but we do not observe significant differences
across quantiles, the only exception being the last quantile, where we obtain a much
smaller impact. Migrants with secondary studies are significant only for the smallest
investments, although the sign of the effect varies. This lack of consistent evidence
could stem from the group of migrants with secondary studies being divided across
A7
job positions, with different impacts on our dependent variable. Primary studies are
significant and negative, regardless of the size of the investment. The explanation
for this is probably that the educational level has a more direct equivalence with a
particular job position: non-qualified jobs. In fact, the pattern across investment
sizes is the closest to those in Table 11 in the paper.
[Table A.7 about here.]
Table A8 also considers the activity at which the investment is targeted. Recall
that managers in Table 9 had a consistent positive effect across all activities (except
construction). Higher education pays off only for sales and its effect is only barely
significant for construction. Secondary education is only positive and significant for
manufacturing activities and primary education is non-significant, except in sales,
where it is negative and significant.
[Table A.8 about here.]
In Table A9 we subdivide j→ i migrants by education level.We can confirm a
positive and significant impact for higher-educated migrants, with mixed results at
the activity level. Moreover, the evidence obtained for lower educational levels is
mixed, at best. This lack of clear evidence regarding the relevance of the level of
education can be interpreted as attesting to a mismatch between migrants’ formal
education and the job they hold, and minimal returns on migrant education.
[Table A.9 about here.]
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Table A1: List of Countries
Source countries (i):
Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bangladesh, Bulgaria,
Bahrain, Belarus, Bermuda, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Algeria,
Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Hong Kong, Croatia, Hungary,
Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iraq, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, Kazakhstan, South
Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Morocco, Mexico,
Macedonia, Malta, Malaysia, Nigeria, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama,
Peru, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Togo, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Taiwan,
Ukraine, Uruguay, United Arab Emirates, United States, Venezuela, Vietnam, South Africa.
Host countries (j):
Portugal, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, France, UK, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, United
States, Mexico, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland, Sweden,
Finland, Greece, Slovakia, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands.
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Table A2: Variable description and sources
Variable Description Source
FDI ijt Intensive margin: Aggregate bilateral greenfield
investments
FDIMarkets
Nijt Extensive margin: Number of investment projects
(firm-level)
ln(Yit ∗ Yjt) Logarithm of the gross domestic products of
home and host countries respectively
World Bank
Dij Distance in kilometers between country capitals
CEPII
borderij Takes the value 1 when countries share a common
border, and 0 otherwise
langij Takes the value 1 if both countries share the
same official language
colonyij Takes the value 1 if the two countries have ever
had a colonial link, and 0 otherwise
lockedij Number of landlocked countries in the pair (0,1,2)
FTAijt Is a dummy that indicates whether both
countries have a free trade agreement in force
UNCTAD
BIT ijt Is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the
country pair has a bilateral investment treaty in
force
managerijt Stock of manager migrants
OECD
professionalsijt Stock of professional migrants
nonqualijt Stock of non-qualified migrants
migraijt Total migration defined as migraijt =
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A4: Results (CYFE)
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(Yit ∗ Yjt) 0.717*** 0.797*** 0.814*** 0.693*** 0.793*** 0.835*** 0.860*** 0.762***
(0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.17) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10)
lnDij -0.391* -0.320 -0.358 -0.371 -0.381*** -0.396*** -0.354** -0.298**
(0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.27) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
borderij 0.050 0.060 0.154 0.108 -0.039 -0.138 0.045 0.067
(0.32) (0.33) (0.35) (0.33) (0.23) (0.22) (0.26) (0.20)
langij 0.003 0.058 0.187 -0.075 0.138 0.183 0.370* 0.072
(0.26) (0.25) (0.27) (0.28) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20)
colonyij 1.007*** 1.079*** 1.084*** 0.930*** 0.793*** 0.800*** 0.875*** 0.695***
(0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.30) (0.19)
smcntryij 0.339 0.642 0.671 0.404 0.735 0.929 1.080* 0.765
(0.71) (0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (0.60) (0.63) (0.56) (0.62)
lockedij -0.580*** -0.605*** -0.558*** -0.539** -0.442*** -0.434*** -0.417*** -0.428***
(0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
BIT ijt -0.797*** -0.909*** -0.901*** -0.684*** -0.752*** -0.774*** -0.698*** -0.635***
(0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14)
FTAijt 0.273 0.447 0.391 0.260 0.051 0.037 0.110 0.064
(0.61) (0.52) (0.57) (0.69) (0.33) (0.32) (0.31) (0.35)
lnmanagerij 0.245*** 0.446* 0.173*** 0.393**
(0.07) (0.23) (0.07) (0.16)
ln professionalsijt 0.180*** 0.140 0.162*** 0.398**
(0.06) (0.24) (0.06) (0.17)
lnnonqualijt 0.139** -0.285* 0.082 -0.539***
(0.06) (0.15) (0.07) (0.11)
Observations 1021 1066 1041 998 1021 1066 1041 998
R2 0.620 0.602 0.613 0.639 0.562 0.563 0.589 0.714
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (PPML estimation in levels). Home*year and source*year country fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A5: Occupation shares
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Managers share 0.713∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.09)
Professionals share -0.443 -0.299
(0.37) (0.19)
Non-qualified share -0.205 -0.143∗
(0.18) (0.08)
Total migrant stock 0.489∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 1636 1650 1639 1636 1650 1639
R2 0.863 0.872 0.864 0.925 0.912 0.913
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (PPML estimation in levels) clustered by country pair.
Home*year and source*year country fixed and country-pair effects included.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A6: Educational levels
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Higher edu 0.919∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.14)
Other levels -0.016 -0.014
(0.10) (0.06)
Secondary edu 0.714∗∗ 0.251
(0.34) (0.19)
Other levels 0.034 0.060
(0.18) (0.11)
Primary edu -0.277 -0.127
(0.19) (0.10)
Other levels 0.556∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.07)
Migrants j→i 0.079∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗ -0.016 -0.027 -0.015
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 467 467 467 467 467 467
R2 0.895 0.879 0.893 0.942 0.935 0.941
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (PPML estimation in levels) clustered by country pair.
Home*year and source*year country fixed and country-pair effects included.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A7: Quantile regression (education)
Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) Q(0.90)
Average project size (mUSD): 14 28 61 79
Higher edu 0.929*** 1.105*** 1.159*** 0.317**
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13)
Other levels -0.402*** -0.385*** -0.390*** -0.003
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10)
Migrants j→i 0.517*** 0.703*** 0.540*** 0.478***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
Secondary edu -0.227*** 0.188** -0.206 -0.103
(0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08)
Other levels 0.124** -0.008 0.158*** 0.181**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08)
Migrants j→i 0.494*** 0.430*** 0.460*** 0.377***
(0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.11)
Primary edu -0.106* -0.334*** -0.542*** -0.573***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07)
Other levels 0.138 0.341*** 0.436*** 0.494***
(0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06)
Migrants j→i 0.494*** 0.442*** 0.388*** 0.351***
(0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 269 269 269 269
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (Dep variable ln(FDI + 1)).
Home*year and source*year country fixed effects.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A9: Sectoral results controlling for education levels
Manufacturing Sales Construction Services
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Higher edu i→j 0.066 0.579∗∗ -0.266 -0.014
(0.27) (0.24) (0.32) (0.18)
Secondary edu i→j 0.475 -0.251 0.316 0.303
(0.30) (0.26) (0.42) (0.25)
Primary edu i→j -0.360∗∗ 0.081 0.180 -0.221
(0.18) (0.14) (0.21) (0.14)
Higher edu j→i 0.879∗ -0.168 0.798∗ -0.143
(0.51) (0.48) (0.46) (0.52)
Secondary edu j→i 0.840∗∗ -0.230 0.202 -0.419
(0.34) (0.28) (0.47) (0.34)
Primary edu j→i -0.329 0.061 0.509 0.626∗∗
(0.25) (0.20) (0.32) (0.27)
Observations 877 937 426 909
R2 0.846 0.982 0.708 0.948
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (PPML estimation in levels) clustered by country pair.
Home*year and source*year country fixed and country-pair effects included.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
A18
View publication stats
